

HOMERIC GODS AND THE VALUES OF HOMERIC SOCIETY

A RECENT article has observed, with particular reference to the Homeric poems, that 'divine intervention <cannot> be simply removed from the poems to leave a kernel of sociological truths'.¹ I agree; though I should interpret the words in a manner different from their author. I shall endeavour to show in this article that not merely divine intervention, but divine behaviour as a whole in the Homeric poems, is governed by the same values as human behaviour in the poems; so that the 'sociological truths'—or whatever they should be termed—can encompass divine as well as human behaviour in Homer. Nor, it seems to me, is this even *prima facie* surprising. True, the conversations on Olympus recorded in Homer are in one sense entirely free composition, since no bard in the tradition had ever met an Olympian or attended an assembly of the gods. But the bards lived in a society which—like later Greek societies that we are better able to observe—believed itself able to discern the hand of gods in the events which befell it or its several members; which, not surprisingly, attributed pleasant events to the favour of its gods, unpleasant events to the anger of its gods; enquired why the god or gods concerned was pleased or angry; and ascribed reasons for divine pleasure or anger analogous to those for which a powerful human being in the society might have been expected to become pleased or angry. After all, apart from the fact that mortals die and the gods do not, the only important difference between gods and men mentioned in the Homeric poems is that the gods have more ἀρετή, τιμή and βνή than men (*Iliad* ix 498).² The gods have more; but more of the same—most important—qualities or characteristics as men; so that the gods might reasonably be expected to be endowed with similar motives by possessing them, and wishing to retain or, if possible, increase them.

I must now try to justify these generalisations by detailed discussion of texts. I shall consider divine behaviour in the light of ἀρετή, τιμή, μοῖρα and φιλότις, together with other words linked with these in usage. To avoid repetition, I shall have to refer my readers to my discussions of these terms in the context of human behaviour.

μοῖρα

In *Merit and Responsibility*³ I argued that Homeric man's use of μοῖρα to explain his own situation took its overtones from the usage of μοῖρα to denote an individual's 'share' in a stratified society. Homeric man does not think abstractly: his share of the material goods of the society is his position in society. In a stratified society, the shares, μοῖραι, will differ from each other. To speak or act κατὰ μοῖραν is to speak or act 'in accordance with one's share', which we render 'as is right', since 'in accordance with one's share' would be strange English; but in so doing we inevitably misrepresent the Homeric situation. The most powerful members of the society, the ἀγαθοί, decide what is in accordance with one's share, be one of high status or low. One's μοῖρα does not *determine* behaviour in a clockwork manner, determine from the dawn of time that one should have eaten an egg for breakfast this morning rather than a kipper, or that one should walk this way home rather than that; but it does *delimit* one's sphere of behaviour, for the 'share' in society, and hence the way of

¹ A. A. Long, 'Morals and Values in Homer' in *JHS* xc (1970) 122.

² The problematical substance ἰχώρ, which is only mentioned twice in Homer (*Iliad* v 339 and 416), may well be an *ad hoc* explanation, devised for Book v, in which the gods not only come down and fight on the field of battle like humans, but are—in

some cases—fighters very much inferior to Diomedes, to account for the fact that though Diomedes can wound Aphrodite he cannot kill her, for gods and goddesses are different in some way. At all events, ἰχώρ does not affect divine values in Homer.

³ (Clarendon, 1960) chapter ii 17 ff.

life, of a king is not the same as that of a beggar, and that of an ἀγαθός differs from that of a κακός. In *Merit and Responsibility* 21 f. I endeavoured to show how the social use of μοῖρα affects its behaviour in contexts where it might be mistranslated by 'Fate' or 'Destiny'; but that is of less relevance here.⁴

Now the same modes of thought appear when divine behaviour is portrayed. In *Iliad* xv 185 ff., Poseidon, who has been ordered by Zeus to return to Olympus or to the sea forthwith, and not to meddle with the fighting, replies

ᾧ πόποι, ἦ ῥ' ἀγαθός περ ἐὼν ὑπέροπλον ἔειπεν,
 εἴ μ' ὀμότιμον ἐόντα βίη ἀέκοντα καθέξει.
 τρεῖς γάρ τ' ἐκ Κρόνου εἰμὲν ἀδελφοί, οὓς τέκετο Ῥέα,
 Ζεὺς καὶ ἐγώ, τρίτατος δ' Ἀΐδης, ἐνέροισιν ἀνάσσω.
 τριχθὰ δὲ πάντα δέδασται, ἕκαστος δ' ἔμμορε τιμῆς·
 ἦτοι ἐγὼν ἔλαχον πολὴν ἄλα ναιέμεν αἰεὶ
 παλλομένων, Ἀΐδης δ' ἔλαχε ζόφον ἠερόεντα,
 Ζεὺς δ' ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι·
 γαῖα δ' ἔτι ξυνή πάντων καὶ μακρὸς Ὀλυμπος.
 τῷ ῥα καὶ οὐ τι Διὸς βέομαι φρεσίν, ἀλλὰ ἔκηλος
 καὶ κρατερός περ ἐὼν μενέτω τρίτατῃ ἐνὶ μοίρῃ.
 χερσὶ δὲ μή τί με πάγχυ κακὸν ὣς δειδισσέσθω·
 θυγατέρεσσιν γάρ τε καὶ υἱάσι βέλτερον εἶη
 ἐκπάγλοις ἐπέεσσιν ἐνισσέμεν, οὓς τέκεν αὐτός,
 οἳ ἔθεν ὀτρύνοντος ἀκούσονται καὶ ἀνάγκη.⁵

Zeus, ἀγαθός though he is, should remain within his own μοῖρα of τιμή and control his own sons and daughters who will be bound to obey him. Poseidon speaks exactly as might a mortal who has inherited a third share (μοῖρα) of his father's land, while his two brothers have inherited the other two shares. Each brother may control what happens within his own share, but not in the other two (and there are areas, like the ἀγορά in human affairs, which are the μοῖρα of no-one). A god's sphere of behaviour, like a man's, is delimited by his μοῖρα. When Homeric man wished to explain the social relationships that obtain among his numerous deities, he naturally used the concepts available in his own human society, and used them in the same way: what else was he to do?⁵

Nor is this use of μοῖρα to delimit the sphere of influence of deity confined to Homer. When the Erinyes, *Eumenides* 169 ff., say to Apollo

ἔφεστίω δὲ μάντις ὦν μιάσματι
 μυχὸν ἐχράνατ' αὐτόσσυτος, αὐτόκλητος,
 παρὰ νόμον θεῶν βρότεια μὲν τίων,
 παλαιγενεῖς δὲ μοίρας φθίσας,

the thought is similar: Apollo has gone beyond his own μοῖρα, sphere of influence, and encroached upon that of the Erinyes. They may also be complaining that Apollo has increased the μοῖρα of human beings, and of Orestes in particular, by what he has done; an idea which we find even in Plato's *Protagoras*-myth, 332A3, where as a result of Prometheus' theft of fire for mankind ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέσχε μοίρας: men obtained part of the gods' share, and thus increased their capabilities.

Both in Homer and in traditional Greek thought of a later period, then, μοῖρα delimits

⁴ But see below, 15 f.

⁵ Similarly, *Odyssey* vi 329 f., Athena did not appear visibly to Odysseus, αἶδετο γάρ ῥα/πατροκασίγνητον, as

a human niece might have done, and Apollo shows αἰδώς which prevents him opposing Poseidon, his πατροκασίγνητον, *Iliad* xxi 469.

not only the behaviour of humans, both in respect of the inevitable and also in respect of what they may or may not do, but also the behaviour of the gods.⁶

τιμή

The *μοῖρα* is a *μοῖρα* of *τιμή*, where human beings are concerned. For example, Odysseus, in Alcinous' court in Phaeacia, gives a portion of meat to the minstrel Demodocus, saying, *Odyssey* viii 479 ff.,

ἑπάσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιχθονίοισιν ἀοιδοὶ
τιμῆς ἔμμοροὶ εἰσι καὶ αἰδοῦς, οὐνεκ' ἄρα σφέας
οὔμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φύλον ἀοιδῶν.⁷

Minstrels have a *μοῖρα* of *τιμή*, for the Muse taught them songs. Other mortals' *μοῖραι* are also *μοῖραι* of *τιμή*; and we have just seen that the same may be said of the *μοῖραι* of Zeus, Hades and Poseidon.

I have argued elsewhere⁷ that human *τιμή* in Homer depends on and *in a sense* consists in the possession of material goods. Not that *τιμή* is simply material goods:

'I am not of course maintaining that *time* is simply material goods, any more than *arete* is simply courage. One cannot adopt an arithmetical approach to *time*, say that in Homeric society each man has a certain number of material goods which is his number, that any wrong done to his property diminishes that number, and that accordingly he attempts to get compensation consisting of the same number of units in order to restore the status quo. *Time*, though rooted in the material situation, is far more than this. A man's *time* is his position on that scale at whose top are the immortal gods, at the bottom the homeless beggar. To *timan* a man is to move him further from, to *atiman* him to bring him closer to, the homeless and the helpless, the man who is nothing. And *time* as a result commends and denotes all that differentiates the way of life of a prosperous chieftain from that of a wandering beggar—property, status, prestige, rights (in some sense) and so on. The emotive charge on this word can only be understood in terms of Homeric *arete* and Homeric society, and the fact that in Homeric society as Homer depicts it—no matter what may or may not have been the case in Mycenaean society—the property, prestige, status and rights of an *agathos* depend strictly on his ability to defend them.'⁸

'That scale at whose top are the immortal gods'; for the gods have more *ἀρετή* and *τιμή* than men. The loss of *τιμή* naturally evokes a violent response in men: 'Accordingly, Achilles' attitude to the loss of Briseis is not childish but—until he refuses compensation, at all events—the natural attitude of an adult *agathos* in this type of society. The Homeric hero not merely feels insecure, he is insecure. To be deprived of *time*, even in the slightest degree, is to move so much nearer to penury and nothingness, to *kakotes*—a change of condition which is *aischron* and, in the society depicted by Homer, quite possible.'⁹

But perhaps the gods have enough *ἀρετή* and *τιμή* not to feel insecure? Here is Poseidon, *Iliad* vii 446 ff.:

Ἰεὺ πάτερ, ἦ ῥά τις ἐστὶ βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαίαν
ὅς τις ἔτ' ἀθανάτοισι νόον καὶ μῆτιν ἐνίψει;
οὐχ ὀράας ὅτι δὴ αὐτε κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ

⁶ See also below, 15 f. For discussion of the behaviour of the *ἀγαθός* when the demands of *ἀρετή* conflict with what is *κατὰ μοῖραν*, see *Merit and Responsibility*, chapters ii and iii, and my 'Homeric Values and Homeric Society' in *JHS* xci (1971) 13 f.

⁷ '“Honour” and “Punishment” in the Homeric Poems' in *BICS* vii (1960) 23 ff.

⁸ *Op. cit.* 29.

⁹ *Ibid.*

τείχος ἐτειχίσσαντο νεῶν ὕπερ, ἀμφὶ δὲ τάφρον
ἤλασαν, οὐδὲ θεοῖσι δόσαν κλειτὰς ἑκατόμβας;
τοῦ δ' ἦτοι κλέος ἔσται ὅσον τ' ἐπικίδναται ἡώς·
τοῦ δ' ἐπιλήσονται τὸ ἐγὼ καὶ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων
ἦρω Λαομέδοντι πολίσσαμεν ἀθλήσαντε.'

The Greeks have built a fine big wall, and they have not given hecatombs—material goods as *τιμῆ*—to the gods. The fame of the wall will cause men to forget the wall which Poseidon and Apollo toiled so hard to build; their fame will be diminished, and if men discover they can build walls without offering hecatombs, they will not offer hecatombs, so that the gods will lose *τιμῆ*. Zeus replies, 455,

ᾧ πόποι, ἐννοσίγαι' εὐρυσθενές, οἶον ἔειπες.
ἄλλος κέν τις τοῦτο θεῶν δείσειε νόημα,
ὃς σέο πολλὸν ἀφαιρότερος χεῖράς τε μένος τε·
σὸν δ' ἦτοι κλέος ἔσται ὅσον τ' ἐπικίδναται ἡώς,'

and advises Poseidon to knock down the wall when the Greeks have left Troy. Some gods might reasonably have such fears, says Zeus, but Poseidon is strong enough to make them unnecessary, to take steps to ensure that his fame persists.

Here we are concerned with fame rather than *τιμῆ* (but an anxious concern with fame is simply another respect in which divine and human behaviour coincide in Homer), though the absence of hecatombs certainly deprives Poseidon of *τιμῆ*. Another passage, however, prominently uses words of the *τιμῆ*-group. In *Odyssey* xiii 128 ff., we find Poseidon, who seems to be of all the gods the most touchy about his *τιμῆ*, saying

Ἴδεν πάτερ, οὐκέτ' ἐγὼ γε μετ' ἀθανάτοισι θεοῖσι
τιμήεις ἔσομαι, ὅτε με βροτοὶ οὐ τι τίουσιν,
Φαίηκες, τοί πέρ τοι ἐμῆς ἕξ εἰσι γενέθλης.
καὶ γὰρ νῦν Ὀδυσῆ' ἐφάμην κακὰ πολλὰ παθόντα
οἴκαδ' ἐλεύσεσθαι· νόστον δέ οἱ οὐ ποτ' ἀπηύρων
πάγχυ, ἐπεὶ σὺ πρῶτον ὑπέσχεο καὶ κατένευσας.
οἱ δ' εὔδοντ' ἐν νηϊ θοῆ ἐπὶ πόντον ἄγοντες
κάθεσαν εἰν Ἰθάκῃ, ἔδοσαν δέ οἱ ἄσπετα δῶρα,
χαλκὸν τε χρυσὸν τε ἄλις ἐσθῆτά θ' ὑφαντήν,
πόλλ', ὅσ' ἂν οὐδέ ποτε Τροίης ἐξήρατ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
εἶ περ ἀπήμων ἦλθε, λαχὼν ἀπὸ ληΐδος αἴσαν.'

Now *τιμήεις* does not mean 'honoured', 'highly-regarded', 'well-spoken-of', but 'possessed of *τιμῆ*' in the full sense of the word;¹⁰ and to *τίειν* is either oneself directly to confer *τιμῆ* upon another or to create a situation in which other people will confer *τιμῆ* upon him.¹¹ If the Phaeacians are able to transport safely and prosperously over the sea a mortal whom the sea-god had determined to allow home, but in misery, then mortals in general are less likely to offer *τιμῆ*—sacrifice—to Poseidon to avert his anger expressed in the form of storm and shipwreck. Zeus reassures Poseidon again, 140 ff.

ᾧ πόποι, ἐννοσίγαι' εὐρυσθενές, οἶον ἔειπες.
οὐ τί σ' ἀτιμάζουσι θεοί· χαλεπὸν δέ κεν εἴη
πρεσβύτατον καὶ ἄριστον ἀτιμίησιν ἰάλλειν.
ἀνδρῶν δ' εἶ πέρ τις σε βίη καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων
οὐ τι τίει, σοὶ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ ἐξοπῖσω τίσις αἰεὶ.
ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις καὶ τοι φίλον ἔπλετο θυμῷ.'

¹⁰ Cf. especially *Iliad* ix 601 ff., discussed *op. cit.* 29.

¹¹ *Op. cit. passim*, especially 31.

Not 'it would be wrong', but 'it would be difficult, χαλεπόν' ἀτιμίησιν ἰάλλειν, because Poseidon is ἄριστος. But what is ἀτιμίησιν ἰάλλειν? According to LSJ, 'to assail him with insults'. But no insults have been expressed, and ἰάλλειν seems not to mean 'assail' anywhere else, but 'send forth' a person or thing (in Homer elsewhere a thing, but in Theognis 573 we have ἄγγελον ἰάλλειν, and cf. Aeschylus, *Choephoroi* 45, *PV* 659 and *Choephoroi* 497, where Orestes prays to the dead Agamemnon ἤτοι δίκην ἴαλλε σύμμαχον φίλοις, where δίκη is at least partly personified). ἀτιμίη is a hapax in Homer, but the adjective ἄτιμος denotes someone who lacks τιμή in the full sense of the word τιμή. Now among mortals τιμή (possessions, without at least a minimum of which it is impossible to live, and status) is a necessary condition of existence. τιμή can only be held in the context of an οἶκος; and the later legal ἀτιμία too is precisely loss of possessions and expulsion from the πόλις, the larger community of later times. In his speech, by using οὐκέτι τιμήεις, Poseidon is referring to his τιμή (possessions plus status) in the community of the gods, and expressing the fear that if mortals ceased to give him τιμή in the form of sacrifice and offerings he might indeed be ἄτιμος. If Poseidon's τιμή were reduced, the gods might ἀτιμάξωιν him, treat him as one without τιμή, and send him forth in a condition deprived of τιμή (ἀτιμίησιν ἰάλλειν), an ἀτίμητον μετανάστην (*Iliad* ix 618), who is precisely someone who wanders from place to place and has no τιμή.

That this should actually happen to a god may be highly unlikely, as Zeus reassures Poseidon; but divine τιμή depends on the action of mortals, as Zeus and Poseidon are both aware. Hence Poseidon on Zeus' advice turns the Phaeacian ship to stone on its way home when it is within sight of Phaeacia. In response to which Alcinous says, xiii 172 ff.,

ᾧ πόποι, ἦ μάλα δὴ με παλαίφατα θέσφαθ' ἰκάνει
πατρὸς ἐμοῦ, ὃς φάσκει Ποσειδάων' ἀγάσασθαι
ἡμῖν, οὐνεκα πομποὶ ἀπήμονές εἰμεν ἀπάντων.
φή ποτὲ Φαιήκων ἀνδρῶν περικαλλέα νῆα
ἐκ πομπῆς ἀνιούσαν ἐν ἠεροειδέϊ πόντῳ
ῥαισέμεναι, μέγα δ' ἦμιν ὄρος πόλει ἀμφικαλύψειν.
ὡς ἀγόρευ' ὁ γέρων· τὰ δὲ δὴ νῦν πάντα τελεῖται.
ἀλλ' ἄγεθ', ὡς ἂν ἐγὼ εἶπω, πειθώμεθα πάντες.
πομπῆς μὲν παύσασθε βροτῶν, ὅτε κέν τις ἴκηται
ἡμέτερον προτὶ ἄστυ· Ποσειδάωνι δὲ ταύρους
δώδεκα κεκριμένους ἱερεύσομεν, αἶ κ' ἐλεήσῃ,
μηδ' ἡμῖν περίμηκες ὄρος πόλει ἀμφικαλύψει.'

Alcinous' father knew that Poseidon was likely to be angry, and to express his anger one day, at the Phaeacians transporting travellers safely over the sea; for too high a success-rate might diminish men's fear of the sea and of the sea-god; and if they did not fear the sea-god, why should they offer him sacrifice, material goods as τιμή? In both these passages, Poseidon expresses a reasonable alarm, for in the case of both gods and men 'since the strongest Homeric terms of value are *not* used to censure anyone who *atiman* an *agathos*, and it is only foolish to do so in virtue of the reprisals which the *agathos* will probably take, it is truer to say that in the last resort the Homeric hero'—and, let me now add, the Homeric god—'employs his *arete* to defend, recover or increase his *time*, with all the implications that the word has been shown to possess, than that *time* is an acknowledgment of *arete*'.¹² Greek gods are more powerful than men, but they are far from omnipotent (note here Poseidon's emphasis on the hard work entailed by his building the walls of Troy, *Iliad* vii 452 f.): a god may reasonably fear that if he does not assert himself and manifest his ἀρετή, he may not receive his τιμή, and become no longer τιμήεις among the immortal gods.

¹² *Op. cit.* 31.

For gods, as for human beings, *τιμή* being material goods with a high emotive charge derived from their importance in the life and well-being of the individual concerned, it is the actual presence or absence of the material objects or *τιμή* that is important, not anyone's intentions or attitudes. So, when Oeneus in *Iliad* ix sacrificed hecatombs to all the other gods and goddesses but, 537, ἢ λάθετ' ἢ οὐκ ἐνόησεν to do so to Artemis, there was nothing deliberate in the slight, but Artemis was none the less ἀτιμότερος, for she had not received the sacrifices which are themselves the *τιμή*, just as Achilles would have been ἀτιμότερος¹³ had Patroclus won so great a victory over the Trojans that the Greeks could have captured Troy without Achilles, since he would not have received the placatory gifts which are themselves *τιμή*, though it would not have been Patroclus' intention to ἀτιμᾶν Achilles. Similarly when Odysseus and his companions ate, under stress of dire need, the Cattle of the Sun, the fact that they would not have done so had they not been starving is beside the point: to destroy the Sun's possessions is to diminish his *τιμή*, and questions of motive or intention are irrelevant. The Sun makes an impassioned speech to Zeus, *Odyssey* xii 377 ff.:

‘Ζεῦ πάτερ ἦδ’ ἄλλοι μάκαρες θεοὶ αἰὲν ἐόντες,
τίσαι δὴ ἐτάρους Λαερτιάδew Ὀδυσῆος,
οἳ μὲν βοῦς ἐκτεῖναν ὑπέρβιον, ἦσιν ἐγὼ γε
χαίρεσκον μὲν ἰὼν εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀστερόεντα,
ἦδ’ ὅπopt’ ἄψ’ ἐπὶ γαίαν ἀπ’ οὐρανόθεν προτραποίμην.
εἰ δέ μοι οὐ τίσουσι βοῶν ἐπιεικέ’ ἀμοιβήν,
δύσομαι εἰς Ἀἴδαο καὶ ἐν νεκύεσσι φαείνω.’

The Sun has clearly lost *τιμή* by losing his cattle. Since he is, *qua* Sun (and he is here, as elsewhere, only half personalised), unable to *τίνεσθαι* Odysseus' crew, he asks Zeus to use his pre-eminent ἀρετή to *τίνεσθαι*, to take *τιμή* from them,¹⁴ to see that they *τίνειν* an ἐπιεικέ' ἀμοιβήν, return, for the eaten cattle. But so far as intentions are concerned the situation is the same as if the Sun were to *τίνεσθαι*, get *τιμή* back, for himself: the *τιμή*-balance must be restored, with a sufficient surplus to appease and restore the confidence of the offended deity.

Now *τιμή* is not merely material goods, but the material goods on which one's mode of life—or in the last resort one's life itself—depends; and it carries the kind of emotive charge that is to be expected in these circumstances. Accordingly, even when restitution or replacement of the *τιμή* is possible, the initial response of the person who has lost *τιμή* is likely to be violent. When Paris absconds with Helen and a large amount of Menelaus' property, the immediate response is the declaration of the Trojan War, not a mere demand for restitution. 'It is only under the formal rules of single combat that Menelaus' *time* may be recovered by restitution—with the addition, it will be noted, of a considerable quantity of material goods. . . . The surplus which Menelaus is given must placate, reassure and restore prestige.¹⁵ Again, Achilles' immediate response to the loss of Briseis is to wish to kill Agamemnon. It is only when Athena, *Iliad* i 213, promises him that he will receive τρις τόσσα . . . ἀγλαὰ δῶρα in due course that he refrains. Any attack on one's *τιμή* is an attack on the basis of one's life and well-being, as the characters in the poems recognize. Hence the initial response is always likely to be violent; and where irreparable destruction of *τιμή* has occurred, a violent response is certain to follow. (Sometimes violence will be necessary in order to recover the *τιμή*: it is incumbent upon the ἀγαθός, human or divine, to defend and if need be recover his *τιμή* with his ἀρετή.)

In the Sun's case, an irreparable loss of *τιμή* has occurred: Odysseus' companions have

¹³ *Iliad* xvi 90. I discuss the passage, *op. cit.* 31.
¹⁴ *τιμή* and *τίνειν* are derived from different roots, but Homeric usage closely associates them; and it is

usage, not etymology, that 'gives a word its meaning'.
¹⁵ *Op. cit.* 30.

no means of replacing the Sun's cattle.¹⁶ The Sun cannot take vengeance himself; but Zeus on his behalf raises a storm and sinks Odysseus' ship with a thunderbolt; which does not restore his Cattle to the Sun, but deprives Odysseus' crew—now dead—of all their *τιμή*, and makes it less likely that anyone in the future will harm any of the Sun's cattle, which are part of his *τιμή*. (Just so might one hang a human cattle-stealer, without inquiring whether he was driven by hunger, to protect one's property for the future.) Similarly Odysseus, *Odyssey* xxiv 325 f., tells Laertes

'μνηστῆρας κατέπεφνον ἐν ἡμετέροισι δόμοισι,
λάβην τινύμενος θυμαλγέα καὶ κακὰ ἔργα.'

Here too the sheep and cattle that the suitors have eaten have gone beyond recall—though presumably the suitors could have replaced them,¹⁷ for they were ordinary animals, unlike those of the Sun; but the other aspects of their behaviour, and the fact that Odysseus could only have recovered his *τιμή*, his material possessions in Ithaca, the basis of his way of life, by defeating—and so presumably killing—them,¹⁸ renders violent *τίσις* necessary.

If we now return to the Phaeacians and Poseidon, we can see more clearly how each evaluates the situation. Poseidon is afraid that if it is seen that the Phaeacians can transport not only travellers in general safely over the sea—a hazardous enterprise for most—but even Odysseus, bitterly hated by Poseidon, it will be concluded that Poseidon has not the *ἀρετή*, the power, to harm them; and if men conclude that Poseidon has little power, they will not suppose him worth placating with offerings, *τιμή*; so that he will become less *τιμήεις*. It does not matter whether or no this is the Phaeacians' intention: it is the result, the actual presence or absence of *τιμή*, that counts. Alcinous, *Odyssey* xiii 180 ff., as an immediate response to Poseidon turning the ship to stone, proposes that the Phaeacians should no longer convoy travellers, and that they should sacrifice twelve choice bulls to Poseidon in the hope that he may not harm them further. He offers Poseidon immediate positive *τιμή*—twelve bulls—and also a course of action, abandoning the safe convoy of others, thereby leaving travellers at the mercy of Poseidon in ordinary ships, which will ensure Poseidon the dread, and the consequent propitiatory and placatory sacrifices—*τιμή*—of the seagoing traveller. And this was, of course, Poseidon's purpose in sinking the ship.

Gods and men alike, then, seem to be motivated, and motivated in the same way, by considerations of *τιμή*. Nor should we be surprised: belief in the Olympians depends on the ascription of certain events in the observable world to the action of personalised beings with motives for action. Since Homeric man knows only one system of values—his own—it would surely be surprising if he were not to interpret the behaviour of his gods in these terms. There is a plague or a famine: some god must be angry. Why is he angry? Why would a human *ἀγαθός* be likely to be angry with his inferiors? To deny him *τιμή* would guarantee his anger:

ἐν δὲ ἰῆι τιμῆ ἡμὲν κακὸς ἦδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός

is a situation of which to complain, as Achilles complains in *Iliad* ix 319, and of course to respond to, either directly by exerting one's *ἀρετή* if one can, or more indirectly by withdrawing one's labour as Achilles has done, in the hope that one's fellows will realise that one's

¹⁶ They speak of giving him a temple and many offerings on their return to Ithaca, *Odyssey* xii 345 ff.; but the Sun's speech makes it clear that the cattle had such value in his eyes that only the death of Odysseus' crew will suffice to compensate him for his loss.

¹⁷ Telemachus, *Odyssey* ii 76 ff., says that if all the

suitors were inhabitants of Ithaca he might obtain *τίσις* by simply asking for restitution: *τίσις* occurs when there is restitution, whatever means are used.

¹⁸ Leocritus, *Odyssey* ii 246 ff., makes it clear that Odysseus could only have recovered his possessions by fighting for them.

strong right arm in battle is needful for victory, and give one *τιμή*; as Agamemnon promised to do, *Iliad* ix 119 ff., offering abundant gifts, one of his daughters in marriage, and seven *εἶ ναιόμενα πτολίεθρα*, where, 154 ff.,

‘έν δ’ ἄνδρες ναίουσι πολύρρηγες πολυβοῦται,
οἷ κέ εἰ δωτήνησι θεὸν ὡς τιμήσουσι
καί οἱ ὑπὸ σκήπτρῳ λιπαρὰς τελέουσι θέμιστας.’

βασιλῆες acquire—from their inferiors—more *τιμή* than others, as we are informed by Telemachus, *Odyssey* i 393, and by Glaucus and Sarpedon, *Iliad* xii 310 ff. They acquire this *τιμή* in virtue of the *ἀρετή*-functions that they discharge for the group of which they are members; and would certainly be angry if, while vigorously discharging those functions, they failed to receive adequate *τιμή*. Now a god’s anger is an empirical matter: it is known—inferred—only when it expresses itself in action, in human disaster.¹⁹ The response to the plague in *Iliad* i is to send for someone, 64 ff.,

‘ὅς κ’ εἴποι ὅτι τόσσον ἐχώσατο Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,
εἴτ’ ἄρ’ ὁ γ’ εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται εἴθ’ ἑκατόμβης,
αἶ κέν πως ἀρῶν κνίσσης αἰγῶν τε τελείων
βούλεται ἀντιάσας ἡμῖν ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμῦναι.’

They assume that Apollo is angry because of ‘vows’²⁰ not discharged or sacrifices—*τιμή*—not performed. Calchas tells them that this is not so, 93 ff.:

‘οὔτ’ ἄρ’ ὁ γ’ εὐχολῆς ἐπιμέμφεται οὔθ’ ἑκατόμβης,
ἀλλ’ ἔνεκ’ ἀρητῆρος, ὃν ἠτίμησ’ Ἀγαμέμνων
οὐδ’ ἀπέλυσε θύγατρα καὶ οὐκ ἀπεδέξατ’ ἄποινα.’

Apollo, however, did not take an interest in the welfare of his priest simply because he was his priest. Chryses prayed to him, *Iliad* i 37 ff.,

‘κλυθί μεν, ἀργυρότοξ’, ὃς Χρῦσῃν ἀμφιβέβηκας
Κίλλαν τε ζαθέην Τενέδοιό τε ἴφι ἀνάσσεις,
Σμυνθεῦ, εἴ ποτέ τοι χαρίεντ’ ἐπὶ νηὸν ἔρεψα,
ἢ εἰ δὴ ποτέ τοι κατὰ πῖονα μηρί’ ἔκηα
ταύρων ἢδ’ αἰγῶν, τόδε μοι κρήνην ἐέλωρ·
τείσειαν Δαναοὶ ἐμὰ δάκρυα σοῖσι βέλεσσιν.’

He has furnished *τιμή* by means of gifts, such as the mortal Achilles was offered in *Iliad* ix 120. This is the manner in which a mortal without a divine parent must seek to obtain the favour of his deity: by giving such *τιμή* which, as we shall see, is intended to render oneself the *φίλος* of the deity whom he will *φιλεῖν* when one needs it. It is also the manner in which the assistance of powerful human protectors must be gained. There is an exact analogy with the situation reflected by Sarpedon’s words in *Iliad* xii 310 ff.

‘Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα
ἔδρη τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείους δεπάεσσιν
ἐν Λυκίῃ, πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὡς εἰσορώοσι,

¹⁹ It is doubtless for this reason that Poseidon, sea- and earthquake-god, is portrayed as being most ‘touchy’ about his *τιμή*: his anger is frequently

observable in very serious human catastrophes.

²⁰ See my ‘*Ἐῤχομαι, εἶχος* and *εὐχολή* in Homer’ in *CQ* n.s. xix (1970) 20 ff.

καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ' ὄχθας,
καλὸν φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο;
τῷ νῦν χρῆ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισιν ἔοντας
ἑστάμεν ἠδὲ μάχης καυστείρης ἀντιβολῆσαι,
ὄφρα τις ᾧδ' εἶπη Λυκίων πύκα θωρηκτῶν·
“οὐ μὰν ἀκλέεες Λυκίην κάτα κοιρανέουσιν
ἡμέτεροι βασιλῆες, ἔδουσί τε πίονα μῆλα
οἶνόν τ' ἕξαιτον μελιγδέα· ἀλλ' ἄρα καὶ ἴς
ἔσθλή, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται.”

The other members of the society give *τιμή*—the material benefits mentioned here—to their *βασιλῆες* on the understanding that the latter will protect them effectively against their enemies; and the reason for sacrifice to the gods, and the manner in which it is characterised and evaluated, are precisely similar. Indeed, the comparison between the status of Glaucus and Sarpedon and that of the gods is explicitly made.

But what of those whom Zeus *Xeinios* protects, the wanderer, the beggar, the suppliant, the guest? These are not in a position to offer material *τιμή* to him, and the beggar may never be able to do so; and they stand in need of protection, for though it would be *αἰσχρόν* for any *ἀγαθός* who had accepted them under his protection to fail to protect them against others, it would not be *αἰσχρόν* for him to harm them himself; and only its being *αἰσχρόν* would be a sufficient restraint. Hence the hope that Zeus *Xeinios* will protect them, and punish, *τίνεσθαι*, anyone who harms them; but it seems at first sight a strange function for a *τιμή*-motivated Olympian. Here too, however, analogy with the human situation may be illuminating. The human *ἀγαθός* too is motivated by considerations of *ἀρετή* and *τιμή*, but once he has taken under his protection a wanderer, a beggar, a suppliant, a guest, his *ἀρετή* itself demands that he shall *successfully* protect him, for it would be *αἰσχρόν* not to do so. Once there is a belief that a god—not simply Zeus, but Zeus *Xeinios*, Zeus god of guests, wanderers and suppliants specifically—has the function of protecting such people, then they become part of the group which he is responsible for protecting with his *ἀρετή*, so that it would be *αἰσχρόν* for him to fail to do so, since it might be inferred that he had not done it because he lacked the power, the *ἀρετή*, to do it. Not even Zeus is omnipotent: even he must be touchy about encroachments upon his powers by men. It would in this way be possible to harmonize this function of Zeus with his other qualities: the human *ἀγαθός* also is a protector, and indeed derives much of his claim to be *ἀγαθός* from the fact that he is a protector against external enemies.

Once such a belief exists, it can be harmonized with the rest of Homeric beliefs and values; and it is possible to see how Homeric society might come to possess the belief, in the situation in which its members found themselves. It is not a question of experiencing a disaster—plague, famine, shipwreck, and the like—and inferring divine anger; but it is nonetheless a belief developed in the society, in this case in response to the needs of the members of the society. The needs of the wandering beggar may be most apparent: when Eumaeus says, *Odyssey* xiv 56 ff., to the disguised Odysseus

‘ξείν’, οὐ μοι θέμις ἔσθ’, οὐδ’ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι,
ξείνον ἀτιμῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἶσιω ἅπαντες
ξείνοί τε πτωχοί τε·’

it is evident that a man who is both a stranger and a *κακός* has no right to *τιμή* on his own account: it is Zeus' relationship with him that should ensure his *τιμή*; and only the possession of *τιμή* will ensure one's continued existence in Homer. But not only beggars need Zeus' protection; and it is of *ικέται* and *ξείνοι* in general that Zeus is the *ἐπιτιμήτωρ*, *Odyssey* ix 271,

the deity who 'puts τιμή upon' them that they would not otherwise obtain.²¹ Protection of the god was extended not only to beggars, but to ξείνοι and ἰκέται in general; and they needed it, for even the most ἀγαθοί had to be suppliants when they came to the οἶκος of a stranger in a strange land where they had no φίλος ξείνος, for they too were dependent on others for their survival when travelling;²² and the story of Odysseus itself shows the privations, the κακότης, to which an ἀγαθός wanderer might be brought by the hazards of Homeric (and later Greek) travel: a shipwrecked ἀγαθός might be indistinguishable from the most beggarly beggar. Nor is it only the wanderer who may need protection: the host himself, the prosperous ἀγαθός in his own οἶκος with its ἰκέται once accepted as guests, is in an area of Homeric life in which co-operation, φιλότης, should prevail;²³ and insofar as his behaviour is governed by the expectations of φιλότης, the ἀγαθός in his own οἶκος is less on guard against the other members of the οἶκος, whether transient or permanent. In these circumstances, it is easier for him to be cheated or harmed in other ways by anyone who transgresses the expectations of φιλότης: the resident ἀγαθός, though apparently—and usually really—in a strong position, may sometimes find himself worsted by his guest, who has of course broken the bond of a co-operative relationship already entered into, as in the case of Paris and Menelaus; and Menelaus, *Iliad* xiii 625, hopes that Zeus Xeinius will avenge him.

Ἀγαθός and κακός, guest and host, accordingly, may all experience a need for super-human aid in relationships which involve the admission of strangers into the οἶκος. Such aid might be sought in a variety of ways:²⁴ it might be hoped for from ἐρινύες, curses objectified and endowed with a life of their own, for fear of such ἐρινύες of harmed πτωχοί, or anyone else in a similar helpless position, might act as a restraint, even though Antinous (*Odyssey* xvii 475) is unmoved by the threat. Again, any wanderer, even the most beggarly beggar, might be a god in disguise (*Odyssey* xvii 483 ff.); and to deny τιμή to a disguised god would be to court disaster, fear of which might extend protection to all beggars and wanderers. But men in such a precarious situation are likely to seek aid from as many super-human sources as possible; and it is of course Homeric man who has assigned the functions of Homeric deity, whether he is explaining natural phenomena or seeking protection. Where all the members of the society need and long for protection in the circumstances I have described, any member of the society may well have at some time or another the strongest possible inducement to hope, to long for, to pray for divine guarantees of good treatment for himself as suppliant or guest—or host—and to hope that others will share the belief. This being so, it is not surprising to find the development of the kind of belief which we have in Homer in a society which also has the other Homeric beliefs, characteristics and values. One should not over-rationalise this, nor present it as the result of deliberate calculation of self-interest: it is sooner a response of the whole personality, and in a sense of the whole society, to the situation. However, no feeling of benevolence towards the ξείνος qua ξείνος need exist, whether as foundation or result of this belief; Eumaeus' words, already quoted, show that it is Zeus, and not any claims that a κακός might have—as it must be, for a κακός has no claims in his own right—that should guarantee good treatment for him. It is true that one of Alcinous' courtiers says, *Odyssey* vii 159 ff.,

' Ἀλκίνο', οὐ μὲν τοι τόδε κάλλιον οὐδὲ ἕοικε,
ξείνον μὲν χαμαὶ ἦσθαι ἐπ' ἑσχάρη ἐν κονίησιν·

²¹ For the implications of ἐπιτιμήτωρ, and for the other points raised here, see ' "Honour" and "Punishment"', 23 ff.

²² See below.

²³ See my ' "Friendship" and "Self-sufficiency" in Homer and Aristotle' in *CQ* n.s. xii (1963) 30 ff.

²⁴ Not all inducements need invoke the super-human. Odysseus offers an argument from enlightened self-interest to the Cyclops, *Odyssey* ix 351 f.: if the Cyclops treats his guests badly, he will be left in isolation. The Cyclops is unmoved; but others might feel the force of Odysseus' words.

οἶδε δὲ σὸν μῦθον ποτιδέγμενοι ἰσχανόνωνται.
 ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ ξεῖνον μὲν ἐπὶ θρόνου ἀργυροήλου
 εἰσον ἀναστήσας, σὺ δὲ κηρύκεσσι κέλευσον
 οἶνον ἐπικρῆσαι, ἵνα καὶ Διὶ τερπικεραύνῳ
 σπείσομεν, ὅς θ' ἰκέτησιν ἄμ' αἰδοίοισιν ὀπηδεῖ.²⁵

Here, though Zeus appears, the use of *κάλλιον*, *ἔοικε* and *αἰδοῖος* links the good treatment of suppliants with other activities which it would be a mark of *ἀναιδείη* not to do (though it would not be *αἰσχροῖον* to do them).²⁵ If—or when—this is accepted, it increases the security of the suppliant; but it is the worthy Eumaeus who also says (*Odyssey* xvii 382 ff.)

‘τίς γὰρ δὴ ξεῖνον καλεῖ ἄλλοθεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν
 ἄλλον γ', εἰ μὴ τῶν οἱ δημοεργοὶ ἔασι,
 μάντιν ἢ ἰητήρα κακῶν ἢ τέκτονα δούρων,
 ἢ καὶ θέσπιον αἰοδόν, ὃ κεν τέρπησιν αἰείδων;
 οὗτοι γὰρ κλητοὶ γε βροτῶν ἐπ' ἀπίρονα γαῖαν·
 πτωχὸν δ' οὐκ ἂν τις καλέοι τρύξοντα ἔαυτόν.’

This refers to inviting *ξεῖνοι*, not to treating well—or even accepting at all—those who chance to arrive; but the speech taken with Eumaeus' other utterance shows that the head of *οἶκος* needed an inducement to accept *ξεῖνοι* at all; an inducement which is supplied by the appropriate deity.

The protecting deity may well originally have been an independent function-deity, *Hiketesios* or *Xeinios*, whose *μοῖρα* it was to protect guests and hosts from each other, as the *μοῖρα* of the *ἐρινύες* of the mother was to haunt matricides. The *μοῖρα* of such a function-deity simply exists as one of the totality of *μοῖραι*, a situation which begins to pose problems when an Aeschylean view of deity and values is taken; but if *Hiketesios* was originally such a deity, the Olympocentric tendency of Greek religion has transformed him into a function of Zeus; and this function, as I have tried to show, then fits into the value-system of a god whose primary concern is his *ἀρετή* and *τιμὴ*, once the belief that hosts and guests, together with those who aspire to become guests, are in a sense part of the household of Zeus and under the protection of his *ἀρετή*.

φιλότης

Next we may discuss the *φιλότης* of the Homeric god in his relationships with mankind. The words *φίλος*, *φιλεῖν* and *φιλότης* are undoubtedly used of gods' relationships with men in the poems, as at *Iliad* ii 195 ff., where Odysseus, speaking of Agamemnon, says to the other *βασιλεῖς*,

‘μὴ τι χολωσάμενος ῥέξῃ κακὸν υἱας Ἀχαιῶν·
 θυμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφῶν βασιλῆων,
 τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστί, φιλεῖ δὲ ἐμῆτιτα Ζεὺς,’

and at *Iliad* xvi 93 f., where Achilles advises Patroclus not to carry his attack right up to the walls of Troy

‘μὴ τις ἀπ' Οὐλύμπιοι θεῶν αἰεγενετῶν
 ἐμβήῃ· μάλα τοὺς γε φιλεῖ ἐκάεργος Ἀπόλλων.’

²⁵ See *Merit and Responsibility* chapter iii 40 ff., and ‘Homeric Values and Homeric Society’ 7 ff.

In such passages *φιλεῖν* is frequently rendered 'love'. But not only has the idea of the love of God overtones in English drawn from another, quite different religion; it may well appear that however much one might reduce the implications of using the word 'love', the idea would still be utterly inappropriate to the Homeric situation. After all, in *Iliad* i 573 ff. Hephaestus says to his mother Hera,

ἦ δὴ λοίγια ἔργα τὰδ' ἔσσειται οὐδ' ἔτ' ἀνεκτά,
 εἰ δὴ σφῶ ἔνεκα θνητῶν ἐριδαίνετον ᾧδε,
 ἐν δὲ θεοῖσι κολῶν ἐλαύνετον· οὐδέ τι δαιτὸς
 ἐσθλῆς ἔσσειται ἦδος, ἐπεὶ τὰ χερεῖονα νικᾷ.⁷

The gods should not strive among themselves over the affairs and interests of mere mortals: it will spoil their feasting; and this attitude seems much more appropriate to deities who are concerned, as we have seen, with their own *ἀρετή*, *μοῖρα* and *τιμή*.

Evidently *φιλεῖν* is used of the behaviour of Homeric deities to mortals; but equally evidently 'love' is an inappropriate translation, just as in the case of *φιλότης* between mortals in Homer. For the latter, *φιλότης* has two elements, the *φίλον*-aspect and the *φιλεῖν*-aspect. The Homeric *ἀγαθός*, virtually autonomous in a largely hostile or indifferent world, has to use the qualities commended by *ἀρετή* in order to survive. 'But no man can survive by his strength alone, without tools, possessions, associates: what *things* (so to speak) can the Homeric *ἀγαθός* rely on? He has his own limbs and psychological functions, his tools, weapons, possessions, and portion of land; and he has his wife, children, servants, and other dependants. On these he can rely, or should be able to; apart from these, only on those with whom he has entered into relations of *φιλότης* or *ξενία*. Human beings have no rights *qua* human beings in Homer,²⁶ only in virtue of some definite relationship, whether resulting from birth, from direct economic dependence, from marriage, or from some other cause. The rest of the world is indifferent or hostile: it competes.'²⁷ *φίλος* in Homer is used precisely to demarcate the persons and things on which one should be able to rely from persons-and-things-in-general; and consequently it carries a high emotional charge 'which is far more powerful than that of "own" in English, in proportion as the needs of the Homeric *ἀγαθός* are far more evident and urgent. The distinction between *φίλος* and "dear" or "friend" (in addition to the difference in range of application) is that we, with our very different society and presuppositions, include much more generosity in our view of friendship. The word is quite untranslatable, for it is locked firmly into the Homeric situation.'²⁸

To find someone *φίλον*, then, is purely selfish; but of course there has to be reciprocity. To put someone in a position in which he becomes a *φίλον* object, someone on whom one can rely when one needs him, one must benefit him, in other words become a *φίλον* object for him; and the element which unites the usages of *φιλεῖν* is beneficial, helpful action. (To say this is not to say that emotion may not sometimes be present when a character *φιλεῖ*; it is to say that emotion is not fundamental.) We may see the reason for this if we consider the case of the man who leaves his own *οἶκος* and travels to a distance. 'When a man is away from his own *οἶκος* he has no rights *qua* human being, only the rights he is guaranteed by some member of the new society into which he has come.'²⁹ He is a *ικέτης*, a comer (or suppliant, for all comers must be suppliants); and if accepted, he may be given the status of *ξείνους* by some one sufficiently powerful member of society, some *ἀγαθός*. Now this relationship only subsists between the comer and the man who *φιλεῖ* him. The unit of power, the social unit, the economic unit is the individual *οἶκος*; accordingly, the comer

²⁶ Cf. 'Honour' and 'Punishment' in the Homeric Poems', *passim*.

²⁷ 'Friendship' and 'Self-Sufficiency' in Homer and Aristotle' in *CQ* n.s. xii (1963) 33.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Cf. 'Honour' and 'Punishment', 25.

has no relationship of *φιλότης* with the remainder of the society into which he has come. When he is in the *οἶκος* of the man who *φιλεῖ* him, he is dependent on the *actions* of that man for his continued existence, outnumbered as he is in a land of potential enemies with no strong centralised government and no belief that human beings have certain rights *qua* human beings. Furthermore, the comer, particularly if he comes by land, can carry little with him: this is a society with no coined money, no readily transportable wealth. What he needs is not primarily sympathy or affection, which are luxuries for a man in his position, but actions: the provision of food, shelter, and protection if he needs it—in short, *τιμὴ*.³⁰ ‘In Homer, then, there are two aspects of the *φιλότης*-relationship. Where the chief concern of the *ἀγαθός* is to secure his own continued existence, a *φίλον* object, whether animate or inanimate, is something he can rely on to use for his own preservation. But *ἀρετή*, the quality of the *ἀγαθός*, is also shown in protecting one’s dependants, whether permanent residents or transients; and *φιλεῖν*, which . . . includes giving food, lodging and protection to transients, characterizes this activity, at all events in its less violent manifestations.’³¹

The mortal characters of the Homeric poems, then, inhabit a world in which very few other human beings—the members of their own *οἶκος*, and those with whom the *οἶκος* is united by bonds of *φιλότης* or *ξενία*—are *φίλοι*, and in which help—or the provision of *τιμὴ*—can only be expected from *φίλοι*. The rest of the world is hostile or indifferent: a right to be helped, or even an expectation that one will be helped, and receive *τιμὴ*, depends on the existence of a definite relationship of practical co-operation: a relationship which is reciprocal. (I have already discussed the manner in which beggars and suppliants are protected.)

We may now return to *φιλότης* between god and man. In *Iliad* xxiv 56 ff., Hera says, in reply to Apollo’s proposal that Hector’s body should be saved from Achilles’ insults,

ἔϊη κεν καὶ τοῦτο τεὸν ἔπος, ἀργυρότοξε,
εἰ δὴ ὄμην Ἀχιλλῆϊ καὶ Ἔκτορι θήσετε τιμὴν.
Ἔκτωρ μὲν θνητός τε γυναῖκά τε θήσατο μαζόν·
αὐτὰρ Ἀχιλλεύς ἐστι θεᾶς γόνος, ἣν ἐγὼ αὐτῇ
θρέψα τε καὶ ἀτίτηλα καὶ ἀνδρὶ πόρον παράκοιτιν,
Πηλείδῃ περὶ κῆρι φίλος γένετ’ ἀθανάτοισι.
πάντες δ’ ἀντιάσθε, θεοί, γάμου· ἐν δὲ σὺ τοῖσι
δαίνυ’ ἔχων φόρμιγγα, κακῶν ἔταρ’, αἰὲν ἄπιστε.’

Hector is a mere mortal; Achilles, as the son of a goddess, is virtually one of the family; and evidently presence at the wedding-feast is held to constitute a bond, as it would were all the persons concerned mortal. Zeus tries to placate Hera, 65 ff.:

Ἦρη, μὴ δὴ πάμπαν ἀποσκύδμαινε θεοῖσιν·
οὐ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ γε μί’ ἔσσειται· ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἔκτωρ
φίλτατος ἔσκε θεοῖσι βροτῶν οἱ ἐν Ἰλίῳ εἰσίν·
ὡς γὰρ ἔμοιγ’, ἐπεὶ οὐ τι φίλων ἡμάρτανε δῶρων.
οὐ γὰρ μοί ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς ἔτσης,
λοιβῆς τε κνίσσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς.’

οὐ μὲν γὰρ τιμὴ γε μί’ ἔσσειται; there can be no equality of status, or of expectation of practical help, where Achilles and Hector are concerned: Achilles, through his mother, belongs to the group in a sense in which Hector, who is not related to the gods, can never belong to it,

³⁰ ‘“Friendship” and “Self-sufficiency” in Homer and Aristotle’, 35. For *τιμὴ*, cf. ‘“Honour” and “Punishment”’, *passim*.

³¹ ‘“Friendship”, etc.’, 36.

though he has always given due sacrifice; but because he has performed due sacrifice, Zeus will do the best he can for him without failing to recognise the superior status of Achilles. Here too Homeric man—and not only Homeric man: these phenomena long persist, by the side of others, in later Greece—is using the values and categories which he applies to the behaviour of human beings among themselves to interpret the phenomena which he ascribes to the actions of deities. The mortal ἀγαθός will regard his own children and wife as most φίλος; his guest-friends are φίλοι, and have a reciprocal arrangement by which the guest receives food, shelter and protection when he is in the οἶκος of the other; and the subordinate members of the οἶκος partake of the φιλότης-relationship, giving services in exchange for their μοῖρα of τιμή, and the protection which the ἀγαθός alone can afford them. The rest of mankind does not come under the protection of the human ἀγαθός at all: any claim to protection and help must be based on the existence of a definite reciprocal relationship of service and assistance. One's φίλοι by blood are of course expected to give such service and assistance; but if they do, their claim is more powerful, as we may reasonably conclude from passages such as *Iliad* xiii 176, where it is said of Priam that he τίει Imbrios, who was not a blood-relation, equally with his own children, and *Odyssey* i 432, where Laertes τίει Eurycleia, a purchased slave, ἴσα κενῆ ἀλόχῳ save that he did not sleep with her. The amount of τιμή given to Imbrios and Eurycleia was unusual: there was usually a scale of τιμή-giving in which the children of the ἀγαθός ranked highest; and τίειν and τιμᾶν characterize, in a somewhat different manner, the same actions as φιλεῖν, as in *Iliad* ix 116 ff., where Agamemnon says of Achilles:

ἄντι νυ πολλῶν
λαῶν ἔστιν ἀνὴρ ὃν τε Ζεὺς κῆρι φιλήσῃ,
ὡς νῦν τοῦτον ἔτεισε, δάμασσε δὲ λαὸν Ἀχαιῶν.'

φιλεῖν emphasizes that the transfer of τιμή forms part of a reciprocal co-operative relationship in which benefits are conferred; τίειν emphasizes the actual conferring of the benefits.

Human beings, then, who are the φίλοι of an ἀγαθός enjoy different status according to whether they are or are not part of the immediate family. (Of course φίλοι who are not part of the family differ in status among themselves: a guest-friend, or a traveller who is an ἀγαθός, is likely to be better treated than a wandering beggar, though Zeus is believed to guarantee that the latter will receive some measure of food and protection: at all events, the fact that the wandering beggar Odysseus receives an ἴση share seems to be emphasized, *Odyssey* xx, 282 and 294,³² as something unusual.) And Homer's characters expect their deities, the supreme ἀγαθοί of their world, to treat them in precisely the same way as do human ἀγαθοί. Achilles' and Hector's respective φιλότης with Zeus and the other gods, and expectation of τιμή from them, are precisely similar to those of two human beings dependent on a more powerful ἀγαθός with whom one is, while the other is not, related.

We may now consider more generally the φιλότης-relationship which kings and powerful individuals—ἀγαθοί—are believed to enjoy with the Homeric gods. At *Iliad* xvi 433 ff., Zeus says to Hera:

ᾧ μοι ἐγών, ὃ τέ μοι Σαρπηδόνα, φίλτατον ἀνδρῶν,
μοῖρ' ὑπὸ Πατρόκλοιῳ Μενoitιάδαο δαμῆναι.
διχθὰ δέ μοι κραδίη μέμονε φρεσὶν ὀρμαίνοντι,'

whether to save him or to allow him to perish. Again, at *Iliad* xxii 168 ff., Zeus says to the assembled gods:

³² Ctesippus' whole speech, 292 ff., is ironical in tone. (That it is Zeus who guarantees help to the κακός traveller is shown by *Odyssey* xiv 56 ff., which I discuss in "Honour" and "Punishment", 25.)

ᾧ πόποι, ἦ φίλον ἄνδρα διωκόμενον περὶ τεῖχος
ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρώμαι· ἐμὸν δ' ὀλοφύρεται ἦτορ
Ἔκτορος, ὅς μοι πολλὰ βοῶν ἐπὶ μηρὶ ἔκηεν
Ἴδης ἐν κορυφῆσι πολυπτύχου, ἄλλοτε δ' αὐτε
ἐν πόλει ἀκροτάτῃ· νῦν αὐτέ ἐ δῖος Ἀχιλλεύς
ἄστν πέρι Πριάμοιο ποσὶν ταχέεσσι διώκει.'

In both cases Zeus is proposing to save a *φίλος*: Sarpedon is his son, and Hector has offered abundant sacrifice. Were there a clash of interests, Sarpedon would have the more powerful claim; where there is no clash, the claims of each are powerful, as are the claims of *βασιλεῖς* and *ἀγαθοί* in general, *Iliad* ii 196 f.:

ἠμὸς δὲ μέγας ἐστὶ διοτρεφέων βασιλῆων,
τιμὴ δ' ἐκ Διὸς ἐστὶ, φιλεῖ δέ ἐ μητίετα Ζεὺς.'

This is not a Homeric statement of the Divine Right of Kings, but a statement of the Zeus-given prosperity, and hence ability to exert power, of kings. *τιμὴ* is possessions-conferring-status-and-security; and *φιλεῖν* requires beneficial *action*, whether god or man *φιλεῖ*. Since Homeric society ascribes successes and prosperity to the gift of the gods, and *βασιλεῖς* and *ἀγαθοί* in general have most success and prosperity, it is to them that most *τιμὴ* is given by the gods; and since no one in Homer, whether god or mortal, would voluntarily give *τιμὴ* save to a *φίλος*³³ (in which category are to be included accepted suppliants, beggars and wanderers), those who receive most *τιμὴ* from the gods manifestly most experience the *φιλότης* of the gods, just as the person who received most *τιμὴ* voluntarily given to him by a human *ἀγαθός* would be thereby shown to enjoy to a pre-eminent degree the *φιλότης* of that *ἀγαθός*. The issue is, and must be, experimental: all that is pleasant and beneficial must happen to a man in this life, in Homeric belief, and there is no possibility that the gods are benefiting a man in life only to punish him after death, or *vice versa*: so long as he prospers, the gods are showing that they *φιλοῦσιν* him. The prosperous man, the *ἀγαθός*, maintains the relationship by abundant sacrifice, which renders him a *φίλον* object to the deity. *φιλεῖν* seems not to be used of offering sacrifice in Homer, but *τίειν* is used, as we have seen. To term it *τίειν* is to represent it as a transference of *τιμὴ* to the deity; and such transference of *τιμὴ* is the cement of Homeric *φιλότης* and the ground for its existence.

The Homeric *ἀγαθός*, then, pre-eminently enjoys the *φιλότης* of the most powerful beings in his universe; and it is in the light of that belief that what is observed to happen to them must be explained. Even kings die, and may die as miserably as Agamemnon died. If the gods could keep death away from anyone, they would certainly keep it from their favourites; and yet they do not, therefore they cannot—or should not. When Zeus proposes to save Sarpedon and Hector, though it is evidently now their *μοῖρα* to die, in the first case Hera and in the second Athena express shock at the suggestion: not because it is impossible to act against *μοῖρα*, for it is not;³⁴ they say (*Iliad* xvi 443, xxii 181) to Zeus:

ἔρδ'. ἄταρ οὐ τοι πάντες ἐπαινέομεν θεοὶ ἄλλοι.'

They will disapprove: it is in accordance with Sarpedon's and Hector's *μοῖραι* that they should die now, so that it would be *οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν* for them to be saved; and nothing, it seems—no amount of *φιλότης*—can excuse one's divine *φίλος* for acting *οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν* in respect of this aspect of one's *μοῖρα*.

When disguised as Mentor, however, and hence behaving as a human being with a human being's range of knowledge, Athena, *Odyssey* iii 236 ff., says:

³³ See '“Honour” and “Punishment”', 32.

³⁴ Above, 2 ff., and *Merit and Responsibility*, 17 ff.

‘ἀλλ’ ἦ τοι θάνατόν περ ὁμοῖον οὐδὲ θεοὶ περ
καὶ φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ δύνανται ἀλαλκόμεν, ὅπποτε κεν δῆ
μοῖρ’ ὀλοῇ καθέλησι τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο.’

Once again it is the φίλος ἀνὴρ who might expect to be saved from death; but ‘Mentor’ says not that the gods should not, but that they cannot save him when it is his μοῖρα to die. Differing beliefs on the same subject are common enough in Greek religion; and we may prefer simply to note this as one example of many; but it is perhaps significant that ‘Mentor’, speaking as a human being, says ‘cannot’: a belief that the day of one’s death is fixed by μοῖρα serves little function in a society unless it is believed that on that day one must die. However, in the ‘free composition’ of episodes set on Olympus, μοῖρα has the same function in the assembly of the gods as in assemblies of men: it is concerned with what it is, or is not, one’s ‘share’—or some else’s—to say or to do; and this is an ‘ought’, not a ‘must’. But whether ‘ought’ or ‘must’, the expectation that the gods should intervene on behalf of their φίλοι, and the explanation of their non-intervention, are carried out in terms of the same concepts of φιλότης, τιμὴ and μοῖρα as are relevant in the evaluation of human behaviour.

Finally we may consider another explanation of a disaster, of the fall of Troy itself. In *Iliad* iv we see Zeus saying of the Trojans, 44 ff.,

‘καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ σοὶ δῶκα ἐκὼν ἀέκοντί γε θυμῶ·
αἶ γὰρ ὑπ’ ἠελίῳ τε καὶ οὐρανῶ ἀστερόεντι
ναιετάουσι πόλῃες ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων
τάων μοι περὶ κῆρι τίεσκετο Ἴλιος ἱρή
καὶ Πριάμος καὶ λαὸς ἐὺμμελίῳ Πριάμοιο.
οὐ γὰρ μοὶ ποτε βωμὸς ἐδεύετο δαιτὸς εἴσης,
λοιβῆς τε κνίσσης τε· τὸ γὰρ λάχομεν γέρας ἡμεῖς.’

Troy τίεσκετο by Zeus, it was φίλη to him, because its people had always given him due sacrifice. Yet he has said to Hera, 37 ff.,

‘ἔρξον ὅπως ἐθέλεις· μὴ τοῦτό γε νεῖκος ὀπίσσω
σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ μέγ’ ἔρισμα μετ’ ἀμφοτέροισι γένηται.’

He warns Hera, 39 ff., not to stand in his way when he wishes to destroy a city which contains men who are φίλοι to her, and Hera replies, 51 ff.,

‘ἦτοι ἐμοὶ τρεῖς μὲν πολὺ φίλταταί εἰσι πόλῃες,
Ἄργος τε Σπάρτη τε καὶ εὐρυάγνια Μυκίηνη·
τὰς διαπέρσαι, ὅτ’ ἂν τοι ἀπέχθωνται περὶ κῆρι·
τάων οὐ τοι ἐγὼ πρόσθ’ ἴσταμαι οὐδὲ μεγαίρω.
εἶ περ γὰρ φθονέω τε καὶ οὐκ εἰῶ διαπέρσαι,
οὐκ ἀνύω φθονέουσι, ἐπεὶ ἦ πολὺ φέρτερός ἐσοι.
ἀλλὰ χρῆ καὶ ἐμὸν θέμεναι πόνον οὐκ ἀτέλεστον·
καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ θεὸς εἰμι, γένος δέ μοι ἔνθεν ὄθεν σοί,
καὶ με πρεσβυτάτην τέκετο Κρόνος ἀγκυλομήτης,
ἀμφότερον, γενεῇ τε καὶ οὐνεκα σὴ παράκοιτις
κέκλημαι, σὺ δὲ πᾶσι μετ’ ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνάσσεις.
ἀλλ’ ἦτοι μὲν ταῦθ’ ὑποείξομεν ἀλλήλοισι,
σοὶ μὲν ἐγὼ, σὺ δ’ ἐμοί· ἐπὶ δ’ εἴπονται θεοὶ ἄλλοι
ἀθάνατοι . . .’

Even though sacrifice has been offered, these unfortunate mortals, *φίλταται* though their cities may be, are not to be allowed to stand in the way of the interests of their deities, and those deities' own *φιλότης*- and *τιμή*-based claims on each other. Hera is (a) a *θεός* of lineage equal to that of Zeus, (b) *πρεσβυτάτη* daughter of Cronos, (c) married to Zeus, who is the supreme ruler of the gods. So, though she cannot resist the strength of Zeus, who is stronger than she, she has her status which, she claims, should be acknowledged. And Zeus—at all events Zeus in this mood—is willing to acknowledge it, and to sacrifice his lower-status *φίλοι*—human beings—lest there should be *νεῖκος* on Olympus between Zeus and Hera and their respective supporters: a state of affairs which, as we have already seen, Hephaestus deprecated in *Iliad* i 573 ff.

Now here once again we have free composition, since no bard had ever been on Olympus; but we have free composition in a context of actual belief. One fact that Homeric and later Greek belief has to account for is that, though all cities sacrifice to the gods, some prosper while others are defeated in war. Later, when deities are believed to be—sometimes—concerned with justice, then the injustice even of an individual may account for divine punishment (*cf.* Hesiod, *Works and Days* 240 f. for an early example); but even later this is not the only belief about the gods' relationship to the cities that worship them; and in Homer sacrifice is usually believed to suffice. But if it does suffice, the fall of the city that sacrifices to its deities urgently needs explanation; the fall of Troy no less than that of other cities, since the ancient Greeks regarded its fall as a historical event. In some cases it might be believed that a city with stronger deities had overcome a city with weaker deities; but according to the legend Hera had successfully opposed Zeus, a stronger god, to achieve the destruction of Troy. It is surely not surprising to find such a debate as we have here, accounting for Troy's fall in terms of the familiar concepts of *τιμή* and *φιλότης*. We have a situation analogous to that of a threatened quarrel between two members of the same family of *ἀγαθοί* over the appropriate treatment for a third person who, not being a member of the family, even if he was linked to the *οἶκος* by *φιλότης*, evidently had less of a claim to receive *τιμή* than a member of the family. Such a person had little hope of equality of treatment from human *ἀγαθοί*; it would be inappropriate, since he was not equal with them in the relevant relationship. The *ἀγαθός*—and indeed everyone in Homeric society—is 'a respecter of persons'; he expects his gods likewise to be respecters of persons, and to regard as most their *φίλοι*, after those who are actually related to them, those who can give them most *τιμή* in the form of sacrifice and offerings, so that the wealthy *ἀγαθός* has an advantage over the *κακός*; but even to have given abundant sacrifice does not entitle an individual or a city to expect the gods to inconvenience themselves severely on his behalf.

CONCLUSION

The gods of the Homeric poems, then, in intervening or failing to intervene in the affairs of men, and in their relationships among themselves, employ the same values and categories as mankind: the society is in this sense one society, and presents a coherent set of 'sociological facts'. Even were the whole, values included, a literary construct, there would be interest in discussing the extent to which the values suited, or failed to suit, the society. But in fact we find these values and beliefs, in circumstances in which there is no question of 'mere fiction', in later authors. For example, Tyrtaeus says to the Spartans, II, 1 f.,

ἀλλ' Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικῆτου γένος ἔστε,
θαρσεῖτ'· οὐπω Ζεὺς ἀρχένα λοξὸν ἔχει·

and 2, 1-4,

*αὐτὸς γὰρ Κρονίων, καλλιστεφάνου πόσις Ἕρης,
Ζεὺς Ἑρακλείδαις τήνδε δέδωκε πόλιν·
οἷσιν ἅμα προλιπόντες Ἑρινεὸν ἡνεμόεντα
εὐρείαν Πέλοπος νῆσον ἀφικόμεθα.*

Zeus gave Sparta to the children of his son Heracles, from whom the Spartan kings traced their descent; and the kings' relationship to Zeus is treated as an adequate reason for expecting him to ensure the victory of Sparta. And this is not 'literature', but reassurance on the basis of which the Spartans of his day are to take action. Many examples could be given³⁵ to illustrate different aspects of the beliefs I have discussed; but the case of Croesus must suffice here. Croesus, the richest man known to the Greeks, gave great gifts to Apollo; and after his defeat, rescue from the pyre, and capture by Cyrus, he thus replied to Cyrus' offer to do him a favour, Herodotus i 90:

*ὦ δέσποτα, ἔασας με χαριεῖ μάλιστα τὸν θεὸν τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν ἐτίμησα ἐγὼ θεῶν
μάλιστα ἐπείρεσθαι πέμψαντα τάσδε τὰς πέδας, εἰ ἔξαπατᾶν τοὺς εὖ ποιεῖντας νόμος
ἔστι οἷ;*

Granted the favour by Cyrus, he tells his messengers to ask 'εἰ ἀχαρίστοισι νόμος εἶναι τοῖσι Ἑλληνικοῖσι θεοῖσι;' the oracle replies, i 91, 'τὴν πεπρωμένην μοῖραν ἀδύνατά ἐστι ἀποφυγέειν καὶ θεῶ.' Croesus was paying the penalty for the ἄμαρτάδα of Gyges, five generations before, who killed his king and took τὴν ἐκείνου τιμὴν οὐδέν οἱ προσήκουσαν. Apollo wished to defer the disaster so that it should fall upon Croesus' sons; but οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγένετο παραγαγεῖν μοίρας to this extent, though he did persuade them to defer the fall of Sardis for three years.

Bacchylides too handles this incident. Croesus on the pyre cries, 3, 37 ff.,

*Ἵπέρβριε δαίμων,
ποῦ θεῶν ἐστὶν χάρις;*

now that Apollo has permitted the capture of Sardis. Bacchylides lays emphasis on the storm of rain that was sent to quench the pyre, and adds that Apollo carried him off with his daughters to the land of the Hyperboreans:

*δι' εὐσέβειαν, ὅτι μέγιστα θνατῶν
ἐς ἀγαθέαν ἀνέπεμψε Πυθῶ.*

The hand of Delphi is apparent in these stories: Apollo's priests are making every effort to exculpate themselves and their deity, faced with the unfortunate fact that the most prosperous ruler known to them had shown himself εὐσεβής by the donation of abundant gifts, but had yet come to disaster. Croesus in Herodotus complains that the Greek gods show no gratitude to those who εὖ ποιεῖν, benefit, them, and says that he ἐτίμησε Apollo most of all; both of which must be understood in terms of munificent gifts to Apollo. In both versions Croesus emphasizes the ingratitude of the gods. Both Herodotus and Bacchylides insist that Croesus in fact benefited in return from the benefits he had conferred upon Apollo; and the values and concepts in terms of which they evaluate the situation are

³⁵ E.g. from a very much later period, Plato, *Republic* 362C; and the 'purification of poetry' (prominently including the Homeric poems) of *Republic* ii and iii is inexplicable unless—as is abun-

dantly clear from extant Greek literature as a whole—the beliefs that Plato reprehends were still widely held in his day.

essentially similar to those of Homer.³⁶ And this is not 'mere literature': Bacchylides immediately continues, 63 ff.:

ὄσοι γε μὲν Ἑλλάδ' ἔχουσιν οὐ τις,
ὦ μεγαίνητε Ἰέρων, θελήσει
φάμεν σεο πλείονα χρυσὸν
Λοξία πέμψαι βροτῶν,

and *θεοφιλή* appears (the text is defective) to be used of Hiero in 69. Hiero's expectations of benefit from the gods, of being *θεοφιλής*, rest on his munificence to Apollo. Hiero is the recipient of the ode: the values must be those which he would find familiar; and they are essentially similar to the values in terms of which Olympian behaviour is understood in Homer. (There are certainly developments in Greek religion between Homer and Bacchylides; but the undogmatic nature of Greek religion renders it possible for new beliefs to arise while the old continue to be held.)

I conclude, accordingly, that not only do Homeric god and Homeric mortal inhabit the same world of value and belief, but that these are the actual values and beliefs of the society in which the poems reached the form in which we now have them.

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³⁶ The belief in inherited guilt appears in Delphi's excuse in Herodotus, it is true; but none the less Delphi maintains that the gods do show gratitude for

favours rendered to them by mankind, so far as they are able to do so.